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Abstract: We used the Wall Street Journal survey data for the period 2006–2012 to analyze
whether forecasts of house prices and housing starts provide evidence of (anti-)herding of
forecasters. Forecasts are consistent with herding (anti-herding) of forecasters if forecasts are
biased towards (away from) the consensus forecast. We found that anti-herding is prevalent
among forecasters of house prices. We also report that, following the recent crisis, the
prevalence of forecaster anti-herding seems to have changed over time.
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1. Introduction
One lesson to be recalled from the recent subprime mortgage crisis concerns the major importance of
the link between the housing market and macroeconomic stability. As witnessed by the U.S. subprime
mortgage crisis of 2007/2008, significant macroeconomic downside risk may loom if housing markets
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collapse. Supporting this view, the results of empirical research by Cecchetti [1] indicate that house price
booms deteriorate growth prospects and create substantial risks of very bad macroeconomic outcomes.
A boom in the housing market may reflect speculative exuberance and herding of investors. A natural
question is whether such herding, to the extent that it occurred, was driven by herding in the forecasts
of professional housing market forecasters. While much research has been done in recent literature to
study herding of, for example, stock market forecasters [2,3] and oil-price forecasters [4], empirical
evidence on herding behavior of professional housing market forecasters is relatively scarce. In fact,
earlier researchers have focused on concepts like housing market efficiency and rationality of forecasts.
For example, Grimes et al. [5] study housing market efficiency and overshooting of house prices
based on regional data for New Zealand. Song et al. [6] and Aggarwal and Mohanty [7] analyze the
rationality of forecasts of U.S. housing starts published in the Money Market Services. Hott [8] reports
that fluctuations in actual house prices exceed fluctuations in “fundamental” house prices. None of the
mentioned studies, however, uses cross-sectional micro data on house prices and housing starts to test
for herding or anti-herding of forecasters. Laster et al. [9] show, in the context of a game-theoretic
model, how the form of forecasters’ loss function may give rise to forecaster (anti-)herding. In their
model, forecasters sell their forecasts to two groups of customers. The first group of customers buys
forecasts from a forecaster who has published the most accurate forecasts over a longer period. The
second group of customers buys forecasts from a forecaster who published the most accurate forecast
in the last period. If several forecasters published the most accurate forecast, these forecasters share the
revenues from the second group of customers. As a result, forecasters have a strong incentive to publish
“extreme” forecasts (that is, to differentiate their forecasts from the forecasts of others).
Only in recent research Pierdzioch et al. [10,11] have studied herding behavior of professional
housing market forecasters. Following their analysis, we implemented a robust empirical test developed
by Bernhardt et al. [2] to study whether professional housing market forecasters did, in fact, herd.
In order to implement this test, we used the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) survey data on forecasts
of house prices and housing starts for the period 2006–2012. The WSJ survey data contain, for
different forecast horizons, forecasts of a large group of individual forecasters, allowing forecaster
interactions (herding and anti-herding) to be analyzed at the micro level. We go beyond the research by
Pierdzioch et al. [10,11] in that our data set also contains forecasts of changes in house prices, whereas
they have studied only housing starts and housing approvals. While housing starts and housing approvals
summarize the stance and prospect of housing markets, house prices are more important in terms of, for
example, balance-sheet effects. Balance-sheet effects, in turn, have been one major channel through
which the current crisis propagated from housing markets to other sectors. We, therefore, deem it an
important contribution of this research that we analyze for the first time whether signs of forecaster
(anti-)herding can be detected in forecasts of changes in house prices. Importantly, our empirical study is
based on recent data that cover the period of time during which U.S. house prices boomed, and the period
of time of the eventual burst of the house price rally following the Lehman collapse and the U.S. subprime
mortgage crisis. Corroborating results of earlier research, our empirical results do not provide evidence
of forecaster herding. On the contrary, we find evidence of forecaster anti-herding in case of forecasts
of both changes in house prices and housing starts. Evidence of forecaster anti-herding indicates that
professional housing market forecasters deliberately placed their forecasts away from the cross-sectional
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consensus forecast. Evidence of forecaster anti-herding is less strong with regard to forecasts of housing
starts after the Lehman collapse, indicating that the prevalence of forecaster anti-herding changes
over time.
In Section 2, we describe the data that we used in our empirical analysis. In Section 3, we describe
the test for forecaster (anti-)herding developed by Bernhardt et al. [2], and we report our results. In
Section 4, we offer some concluding remarks.
2. The Data
The WSJ conducts, on a monthly basis (during the time period that we analyze), a questionnaire
survey of professional forecasters. Professional forecasters are asked about their forecasts of several
important financial U.S. variables. When the questionnaire survey was launched in 1981, the focus was
on the expected development of the Fed prime rate. In later years, the number of economic variables
covered by the questionnaire survey has increased considerably. For example, since January 1985,
participants have also been asked to forecast the GNP growth rate and, since 1991, the GDP growth rate.
The inflation rate and the unemployment rate have been incorporated into the questionnaire survey since
1989. Additionally, since 2002, the WSJ has published forecasts of the Federal Funds Rate. Since August
2006, the questionnaire survey includes data on forecasts of changes in house prices and forecasts of
housing starts for the current year and the next year. Until August 2012, 68 forecasters have participated
in the WSJ questionnaire surveys yielding more than 3000 forecasts.
The WSJ survey data have been used in several earlier empirical studies. The research questions
analyzed in earlier empirical studies, however, significantly differ from our research question. For
example, Greer [12] analyzes whether the forecasters accurately predict the direction of change of yields
on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds correctly and finds some evidence that this is indeed the case. Cho and
Hersch [13] analyze whether the characteristics of forecasters help to explain forecast accuracy (i.e., the
size of the forecast error) and/or the forecast bias (i.e., the sign of the forecast error). While the authors
find that characteristics of forecasters do not help to explain forecast accuracy, some characteristics like
the professional experience of a forecaster with the Federal Reserve System seem to have power for
explaining the forecast direction error. Kolb and Stekler [14] report a high degree of heterogeneity of
WSJ forecasts, implying that standard central moments (mean, median) do not adequately describe the
rich cross-sectional structure of forecasts. Eisenbeis et al. [15] analyze the methodology used by the WSJ
to construct an overall ranking of forecasters. Because the WSJ ranks the forecasts on the sum of the
weighted absolute percentage deviation from the actual realized value of each series, this methodology
neglects correlations among the forecasted variables. Mitchell and Pearce [16] analyze the unbiasedness
and forecast accuracy of individual forecasters with respect to their interest rate and exchange rate
forecasts. They find that several forecasters form biased forecasts, and that most forecasters cannot
out-predict a random walk model.
The WSJ survey data have several interesting features. First, the WSJ is the only survey covering
house price forecasts. It publishes forecasts of changes in house prices and housing starts made by a large
number of individual forecasters, and not only the mean forecast used in other studies [6,7]. Second, the
WSJ publishes individual forecasts together with the names of forecasters and the institutions at which
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they work, implying that forecaster reputation may be linked to forecast accuracy. A link between
forecaster reputation and forecast accuracy may strengthen incentives of survey participants to submit
their best rather than their strategic forecast [17], or it may strengthen incentives to strategically deviate
from the “consensus” forecast and to “lean against the trend”. Strategic deviations from the consensus
forecast may result in systematic forecaster “anti-herding”. Laster et al. [9] develop a theoretical model
that illustrates how anti-herding of forecasters can easily arise in a game-theoretic model of forecaster
interaction. Third, forecasters who participate in the WSJ questionnaire survey not only take a stance
on the direction of change of a variable but also forecast the level of a variable. Fourth, the WSJ
survey data contain information on forecasts formed by private-sector forecasters rather information
on forecasts of international institutions. The forecasts published by international institutions may have
characteristics that differ quite substantially from the characteristics of private-sector forecasters. For
example, Batchelor [18] shows that private-sector forecasts are less biased and more accurate in terms
of mean absolute error and root mean square error than forecasts published by the OECD and the IMF.
Fifth, the WSJ conducts the questionnaire surveys at a monthly basis, implying that the data are available
at a relatively high frequency, where the data are readily available to the public and the participating
forecasters. This makes it possible to analyze interactions among forecasters. Sixth, the WSJ survey
data cover the duration of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, rendering it possible to analyze forecasts
of changes in house prices and housing starts in times of financial and economic distress. Finally, the
WSJ survey data contain forecasts for different forecast horizons, that is, for the current year and the next
year. Therefore, we can analyze short-term forecasts and medium-term forecasts (that is, the forecast
horizons vary between one and twelve months for short-term forecasts and between 13 and 24 months
for next-year forecasts).
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the WSJ survey data. The sample period is from August
2006 to August 2012. Because the sample period covers the period of financial market jitters following
the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, it is not surprising that forecasters expected on average house
prices to decrease by about −2.3 percent (p.a.). The actual house prices decreased by −2.6 percent.
Medium-term forecasts indicate that forecasters expected on average a slight increase in house prices by
0.13 percent. With regard to medium-term prospects for house prices, forecasters thus were on average
more optimistic. Similarly, forecasters expected on average housing starts of about 0.88 million units
(p.a.), where the actual number of housing starts was about 0.84 million units. The medium-term forecast
(1.03 million units) again is slightly larger than the short-term forecast.
Figures 1 (change in house prices) and 2 (housing starts) illustrate that one should not only focus
on the cross-sectional, time-averaged mean values of forecasts. A characteristic feature of the WSJ
data is that forecasts witness a characteristic cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts of both changes in
house price and housing starts. In Figures 1 and 2, the cross-sectional heterogeneity of forecasts is
measured in terms of the cross-sectional range of forecasts (shaded areas). Cross-sectional dispersion
of forecasts of, for example, exchange rates has been widely documented in recent literature (see, for
example [19]). Pierdzioch et al. [10,11] have documented cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts of
housing starts and housing approvals. To the best of our knowledge, the cross-sectional dispersion of
forecasts of changes in house prices has not been documented in earlier literature. Given the substantial
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cross-sectional dispersion of the WSJ data, we used in our empirical analysis individual forecasts of
changes in house prices and housing starts rather than cross-sectional mean values.
Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Survey Data (2006–2012).
Panel A: Forecasts of House Prices (percentage change p.a.)
Short-Term Medium-Term Actual
Mean −2.259 0.134 −2.626
Standard Deviation (0.066) (0.060) (0.055)
Observations 3,524 3,171 68
Panel B: Forecasts of Housing Starts (in million units)
Short-Term Medium-Term Actual
Mean 0.884 1.031 0.840
Standard Deviation (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 3,648 3,240 68
Note: The short-term (medium-term) forecasts refer to the forecasts for the current (next) year. The
actual values were taken from Federal Housing Finance Agency.
Figure 1. Expected and Actual Change in House Prices.
15
Datenreihen5
10 Datenreihen1
0
5
-5
-10
20
-15
-25
-
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Notes: Figure 1 shows the mean of the short-term forecasts of the relative change in house price (dashed line),
the actual change in house prices (solid line), and the forecast range (shaded area).
In addition to the cross-sectional dispersion of the WSJ data, Figures 1 and 2 plot time series of (i) the
cross-sectional mean values of the forecasts of changes in house prices and forecasts of housing starts
(dashed lines); and, (ii) the actual relative change in house prices and the actual housing starts (solid
lines). The cross-sectional mean values of changes in house prices and housing starts move in tandem
with the respective actual values, at least as results for end-of-year values are concerned. This result is in
line with economic intuition because forecast accuracy should increase as the forecast horizon decreases.
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Figure 2. Expected and Actual Housing Starts.
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Notes: Figure 2 shows the mean of the short-term forecasts of housing starts (dashed line), the actual housing
starts (solid line), and the forecast range (shaded area). Housing starts in mn. units.
3. (Anti-)Herding of Forecasters
The significant cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts of changes in house prices and of forecasts
of housing starts gives rise to the question whether herding (or anti-herding) of forecasters helps to
explain this dispersion. Herding of forecasters arises if forecasters deliberately center their forecasts
around a consensus forecast. The consensus forecast can be represented by the cross-sectional mean
of the forecasts made by forecasters who participate, in a given forecasting cycle, in a questionnaire
survey. Anti-herding, in contrast, arises if forecasts try to differentiate forecasts by deliberately placing
their forecast farther away from the consensus forecast. This definition of forecaster (anti-) herding
should make clear that our analysis concerns the cross-sectional herding (or anti-herding) of forecasters.
In earlier empirical research, researchers have used the term “herding” to characterize the time-series
properties of forecasts. Our use of the term herding, thus, should not be confused with the terminology
used by other researchers who have used the term herding to describe, for example, trend-extrapolative
forecasts in a time-series context.
We used a test that has recently been developed by Bernhardt et al. [2] to analyze whether forecasters
(anti-)herd. Using this test ensures that our results can be readily compared with results reported recently
by Pierdzioch et al. [10,11]. The test is easy to implement, the economic interpretation of the test results
is straightforward, and the test is robust to various types of specification errors. The mechanics of the
test can be illustrated by considering a forecaster who forms an efficient private forecast of house prices
or housing starts. The forecaster derives her private forecast by applying her optimal forecasting model,
and by using all information available to her at the time she forms the forecast. Her private forecast, thus,
should be unbiased, and the probability that her unbiased private forecast overshoots or undershoots the
future house price should be 0.5.
The published forecast may differ from the private forecast if the published forecast is influenced
by the consensus forecast. In the case of herding, a forecaster places her published forecast closer
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to the consensus forecast than warranted by her private forecast. The published forecast will be biased
towards the consensus forecast. In case the private forecast exceeds the consensus forecast, the published
forecast thus will be smaller than the private forecast. The probability of undershooting is then smaller
than 0.5. In a similar vein, if the private forecast is smaller than the consensus forecast, the probability
that future house prices or future housing starts overshoot the published forecast is also smaller than 0.5.
In contrast, in the case of anti-herding, the published forecast will be farther away from the consensus
forecast than the private forecast. The result is that the probability of undershooting and the probability
of overshooting will be larger than 0.5.
The probabilities of undershooting and overshooting (computed as the relative frequencies of events,
using data for all forecasters) can be used to develop a simple test of herding and anti-herding. Under
the null hypothesis that forecasters neither herd nor anti-herd, the probability, P , that forecasts of future
house prices or housing starts (Ei,t[st+1], where i is a forecaster index) overshoot (undershoot) future
house prices or housing starts (st+1) should be 0.5, regardless of the consensus forecast (E¯t[st+1]). The
conditional probability of undershooting in the case forecasts exceed the consensus forecast should be
P (st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] |Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t[st+1], st+1 6= Ei,t[st+1]) = 0.5 (1)
and the conditional probability of overshooting in the case forecasts are smaller than the consensus
forecast should be
P (st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] |Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t[st+1], st+1 6= Ei,t[st+1]) = 0.5 (2)
In the case of herding, published forecasts will center around the consensus forecast, implying that the
conditional probabilities should be smaller than 0.5. In the case of anti-herding, the published forecasts
will be farther away from the consensus forecast, and the conditional probabilities should be larger
than 0.5. The test statistic, S, defined as the arithmetic average of the sample estimates of the two
conditional probabilities, should assume the value S = 0.5 in the case case of unbiased forecasts, the
value S < 0.5 in the case of herding, and the value S > 0.5 in the case of anti-herding. (For a graphical
illustration of how forecaster (anti-)herding affects the undershooting and overshooting probabilities,
See Pierdzioch et al. [4].) Bernhardt et al. [2] show that the test statistic S, asymptotically has a normal
sampling distribution. They also demonstrate that, due to the averaging of conditional probabilities, the
test statistic, S, is robust to phenomena like, for example, correlated forecast errors and optimism or
pessimism among forecasters. Such phenomena make it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of
unbiased forecasts.
The results summarized in Table 2 show that the test statistic, S, significantly exceeds the value
0.5, providing strong evidence of forecaster anti-herding. (The number of observations is slightly
smaller than in Table 1 because some forecasts are equal to the subsequently realized value, that is,
st+1 = Ei,t[st+1]. Equations (1) and (2) show that such forecasts were dropped from the analysis.) The
evidence of anti-herding is strong regardless of the forecast horizon and regardless of whether we studied
forecasts of changes in house prices or housing starts. We computed the test statistic, S, using the
consensus of the previous period, E¯t−1[st], because forecasters deliver their forecasts simultaneously,
implying that the contemporaneous consensus forecast may not be in forecasters information set. More
precisely, we used the forecast from the predecessor survey to compute the consensus forecast. As
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for January forecasts, we used the medium-term December forecasts to compute the consensus forecast.
(We also found strong evidence of forecaster anti-herding when we used the contemporaneous consensus
forecast to compute the test statistic, S. Results are not reported, but available upon request.)
Table 2. Test for Herding.
Panel A: Short-Term Forecasts of House Prices
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 633 / 35.1 % 1,341 / 78.3 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 1,171 / 64.9 % 371 / 21.7 %
Sum 1,804 / 100.0 % 1,712 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.716
Stand. Error 0.0084
Lower 99 % 0.694
Upper 99 % 0.738
Observations 3,516
Panel B: Medium-Term Forecasts of House Price
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 795 / 57.4 % 1,341 / 85.3 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 589 / 42.6 % 232 / 14.7 %
Sum 1,384 / 100.0 % 1,573 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.639
Stand. Error 0.0092
Lower 99 % 0.615
Upper 99 % 0.663
Observations 2,957
Panel C: Short-Term Forecasts of Housing Starts
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 972 / 49.4 % 1,266 / 85.3 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 995 / 50.6 % 219 / 14.7 %
Sum 1,967 / 100.0 % 1,485 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.679
Stand. Error 0.0086
Lower 99 % 0.657
Upper 99 % 0.702
Observations 3,452
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Table 2. Cont.
Panel D: Medium-Term Forecasts of Housing Starts
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 1,153 / 72.8 % 1,336 / 96.6 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 430 / 27.2 % 47 / 3.4 %
Sum 1,583 / 100.0 % 1,383 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.619
Stand. Error 0.0092
Lower 99 % 0.595
Upper 99 % 0.643
Observations 2,966
To analyze the impact of the Lehman collapse on expectation formation in the housing market, we
split the sample period into two subsample periods in Tables 3 and 4: a pre-Lehman collapse subsample
period, and a post-Lehman collapse subsample period. The results confirm that forecasters of changes
in house prices anti-herd before and after the Lehman collapse. Interestingly, forecaster anti-herding
tends to be more pronounced in the period before the Lehman collapse with regard to housing starts. For
medium-term forecasts of housing starts, the herding statistic even becomes only marginally significant
in the post-Lehman sample. While the interpretation of this result should not be stretched too far, it may
reflect that the strategic interactions between forecasters of housing starts have become weaker after the
collapse of Lehman brothers, and after the housing rally pricked.
Table 3. Test for Herding before Lehman.
Panel A: Short-Term Forecasts of House Prices
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 463 / 36.7 % 795 / 72.1 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 798 / 63.3 % 308 / 27.9 %
Sum 1,261 / 100.0 % 1,103 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.677
Stand. Error 0.0103
Lower 99 % 0.650
Upper 99 % 0.704
Observations 2,364
Int. J. Financ. Stud. 2013, 1 25
Table 3. Cont.
Panel B: Medium-Term Forecasts of House Price
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 408 / 47.1 % 779 / 77.4 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 459 / 52.9 % 228 / 22.6 %
Sum 867 / 100.0 % 1,007 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.651
Stand. Error 0.0116
Lower 99 % 0.621
Upper 99 % 0.682
Observations 1,874
Panel C: Short-Term Forecasts of Housing Starts
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 632 / 45.2 % 797 / 84.1 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 767 / 54.8 % 151 / 15.9 %
Sum 1,399 / 100.0 % 948 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.694
Stand. Error 0.0105
Lower 99 % 0.667
Upper 99 % 0.722
Observations 2,347
Panel D: Medium-Term Forecasts of Housing Starts
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 647 / 60.9 % 776 / 94.3 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 415 / 39.1 % 47 / 5.7 %
Sum 1,062 / 100.0 % 823 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.667
Stand. Error 0.0116
Lower 99 % 0.636
Upper 99 % 0.697
Observations 1,885
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Table 4. Test for Herding after Lehman collapse.
Panel A: Short-Term Forecasts of House Prices
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 172 / 31.6 % 544 / 89.5 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 372 / 68.4 % 64 / 10.5 %
Sum 544 / 100.0 % 608 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.789
Stand. Error 0.0148
Lower 99 % 0.751
Upper 99 % 0.828
Observations 1,152
Panel B: Medium-Term Forecasts of House Price
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 385 / 74.2 % 564 / 100.0 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 134 / 25.8 % 0 / 0.0 %
Sum 519 / 100.0 % 564 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.629
Stand. Error 0.0152
Lower 99 % 0.589
Upper 99 % 0.669
Observations 1,083
Panel C: Short-Term Forecasts of Housing Starts
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 333 / 59.8 % 476 / 86.9 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 224 / 40.2 % 72 / 13.1 %
Sum 557 / 100.0 % 548 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.635
Stand. Error 0.0150
Lower 99 % 0.596
Upper 99 % 0.675
Observations 1,105
Panel D: Medium-Term Forecasts of Housing Starts
Ei,t[st+1] < E¯t−1[st] Ei,t[st+1] > E¯t−1[st]
st+1 < Ei,t[st+1] 453 / 88.0 % 566 / 100.0 %
st+1 > Ei,t[st+1] 62 / 12.0 % 0 / 0.0 %
Sum 515 / 100.0 % 566 / 100.0 %
S-Stat 0.560
Stand. Error 0.0152
Lower 99 % 0.520
Upper 99 % 0.600
Observations 1,081
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As yet another robustness test, we tested whether forecaster (anti-)herding is stable over the
forecasting cycle. To this end, we computed the test statistic, S, for each month separately (that is, for
forecasts made in January, forecasts made in February, ...), where we used data from the previous month
to compute the consensus forecast. Figures 3 and 4 report the results based on the current-year forecasts.
(We do not present results for the next-year forecasts because we do not have a consensus forecast for
next-year forecasts in January. Results for next-year forecasts are qualitatively similar and are available
upon request.) Results show strong evidence of forecaster anti-herding for all months in the case of
forecasts of house price changes. The test statistic, S, always settles above the 0.5 line. Concerning
current-year forecasts of housing starts, we also find strong evidence of forecaster anti-herding, but the
results are somewhat more variable across months as compared with forecasts of changes of house prices.
December forecasts are not significantly different from 0.5.
Figure 3. Test Statistic for Every Month (Changes of House Prices, Current-Year Forecasts).
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Note: This figure shows the test statistic, S, for each month separately. The solid line represents the test
statistic, S, while the shaded area shows the 99% confidence interval.
Figure 4. Test Statistic for Every Month (Housing Starts, Current-Year Forecasts).
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Note: This figure shows the test statistic, S, for each month separately. The solid line represents the test
statistic, S, while the shaded area shows the 99% confidence interval.
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4. Concluding Remarks
We have used the monthly WSJ survey data on forecasts of changes in house prices and housing starts
to analyze (anti-)herding of forecasters during the recent U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. Confirming
results of recent research, our results show that anti-herding was prevalent among forecasters. This
also holds for forecasts of changes in house prices, which have not been studied in recent research on
forecaster anti-herding. In conjunction with results reported in earlier research for different data sets, our
results for the WSJ survey data suggest that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, anti-herding prevails
among forecasters of housing markets. Our results further indicate that, depending on the variable being
forecasted, the extent of forecaster anti-herding may have changed over time. In particular, our results
imply that, after the collapse of Lehman brothers, forecaster anti-herding may have become less prevalent
with regard to forecasts of housing starts. Forecasts of changes in house prices, however, show strong
signs of forecaster anti-herding even in the subsample period following the Lehman collapse.
In economic terms, it may be the case that the prevalence of forecaster anti-herding reflects changing
demand for forecasts during periods of housing booms and housing busts. If demand for forecasts falls
during a housing bust, incentives to anti-herd may weaken because potential revenues a forecaster can
earn by making an extreme forecast are smaller than during a housing boom. The prevalence of forecaster
anti-herding also may respond to changing uncertainty. For example, Bewley and Fiebig [20] find that
anti-herding among interest rate forecasters is positively correlated with the volatility of interest rates.
It is interesting to study in future research whether a similar correlation between forecaster anti-herding
and volatilities of changes in house prices and housing starts can be detected in the data that we have
studied in this research.
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